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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN GONZALES, : BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau 
Chief, Driver Control Bureau, Driver 
License Division, Department of Public 
Safety, State of Utah, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Respondent/Appellee G. Barton Blackstock, Bureau Chief, State of Utah, Driver 
License Division ("the Division") responds to John Gonzales's ("Gonzales") appeal of 
the lower court's final order that denied Gonzales's petition for appellate review and 
upheld the Division's administrative order revoking his driving privilege. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Gonzales appeals from the District Court's final order entered April 22, 2004 
following a trial de novo. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) (West 2004). 
Case No. 20040274-CA 
(Lower Docket No. 03092587 AA) 
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ISSUE / STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Whether the District Court erred when it ruled that Deputy Mulder, the 
officer who arrested Gonzales, complied with the statutory requirements of warning 
Gonzales of the consequences of refusing the chemical test. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law under a correction-of-error standard. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 
100 R3d 1177; Miller v. BlackstocL 2001 UT App 352, 36 R3d 525, 526. 
Where the application of the legal standard is extremely fact sensitive, as in this 
case, the reviewing court should generally give the trial court considerable discretion in 
determining whether the facts of a particular case come within the estabUshed rule of law. 
Chen 2004 UT 82, f 20. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44. (West 2004). Addendum A, at 1. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44.10 (West 2004). Addendum A, at 9. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44.10(2) (West 2004). 
If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been 
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of 
the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit 
to any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by 
the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to 
submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the 
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) (West 2004). 
(2) Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or local agencies; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gonzales was arrested on September 17, 2003, for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44, Addendum B, f 1. The Division issued an order on October 11, 2003, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, that revoked Gonzales's driving privilege for a period of 
eighteen months effective October 17, 2003. Gonzales filed a Petition for Judicial 
Review on November 17, 2003. 
A trial de novo was held on February 25, 2004, before the Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki. Gonzales neither testified nor presented any evidence on his behalf. Addendum 
C. At the conclusion of the trial de novo, Judge Iwasaki ruled that Deputy Mulder had 
properly informed Gonzales of the consequences of refusing the blood test. Addendum B 
at 4 & 5; Addendum C at 31. Judge Iwasaki entered an order denying Gonzales's petition 
for review and upholding the Division's eighteen month revocation order. Addendum B 
at 5. Gonzales filed his notice of appeal on March 26, 2004. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 17, 2003, Gonzales failed to stop after he rear ended a vehicle. 
Addendum B, fj[ 1-3. A witness to the hit and run accident called 911 reported the 
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accident, and gave a description and location of the vehicle. Id. at f 1. Deputy Mulder 
went to the location of the vehicle given by the witness. Id at f l 1-2, When Deputy 
Mulder arrived the witness pointed out Gonzales's vehicle. Id. at f 2. Deputy Mulder then 
observed Gonzales, struggling to get out of the driver's side of his vehicle. Id. When he 
approached Gonzales, Deputy Mulder smelled a strong, sickening odor of alcoholic 
beverage coming from Gonzales's person. Id. at f 3. Gonzales's speech was slurred and 
his balance was poor. Id. Deputy Mulder had Gonzales perform some field sobriety tests. 
Gonzales failed to follow Deputy Mulder's instructions during the Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus test. Id. at <j[ 4. Gonzales did not perform any other field sobriety tests because 
of his bad knees. Id. at f 3. Gonzales was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol, in violation of section 41-6-44. Id. at 16 . 
After Gonzales was placed under arrest, Deputy Mulder read Gonzales the chemical 
test admonitions verbatim as they appear on the DUI Report form. Id. at f 7. Gonzales 
stated that he understood he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and /or 
drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled substance or metabolite in his body. Id. 
Deputy Mulder requested that Gonzales take a breath test. Id. at f 8. Deputy Mulder then 
informed Gonzales that a test result that indicates an unlawful amount of alcohol, drug or 
controlled substance or its metabolite in his breath in violation of Utah law may result in 
denial, suspension, revocation or disqualification of his driving privilege or refusal to issue 
him a license. Id. Gonzales agreed to take a breath test. Id. 
Deputy Mulder told Gonzales how to blow into the Intoxilyzer. Addendum C at 11. 
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Gonzales did not comply with Deputy Mulder's instructions for blowing into the 
Intoxilyzer. Addendum B, f 9. Gonzales did not blow with enough pressure for a 
consistent amount of time for the Intoxilyzer to obtain a valid result. Addendum C at 10 & 
11. Gonzales blew into the Intoxilyzer numerous times, but would not maintain the blow 
for the required length of time Addendum B, f 9. Deputy Mulder told him numerous 
times that he had to blow longer, but each time Gonzales would stop blowing. Addendum 
B, f 9; Addendum C at 11. Deputy Mulder explained to Gonzales numerous times how to 
blow into the Intoxilyzer. Addendum B, f 9; Addendum C at 11. The Intoxilyzer did not 
give a valid result, but reported an "insufficient sample" with a highest value obtained of 
.195. Addendum B, f 9; Addendum C at 11. Since Officer Mulder was unable to get a 
valid breath test, he called for a blood draw technician and took Gonzales to jail. 
Addendum B, f 9; Addendum C at 12. 
The blood technician arrived at 2:54 a.m., at which time, Officer Mulder explained 
to Gonzales that he had failed to follow the instructions for the Intoxilyzer, which is 
considered a refusal. Addendum B, f 10; Addendum C at 21. Officer Mulder showed him 
the Intoxilyzer result card that showed an insufficient sample. Addendum B, f 10; 
Addendum C at 21. Deputy Mulder read Gonzales the refusal admonition verbatim off of 
the DUI Report Form. Addendum B, f 10; Addendum C at 13. Deputy Mulder then 
informed Gonzales that if "he refuses the tests or fail to follow his instructions the tests 
will not be given." Addendum B, f 10; Addendum C at 13. Gonzales was then warned 
that "his driving privilege may be revoked for 18 months for a first refusal or 24 months 
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for a subsequent refusal with no provision for limited driving." Addendum B, f 10; 
Addendum C at 13. Gonzales was also informed that "after he has taken the tests, he will 
be permitted to have a physician of his own choice administer a test at his own expense, in 
addition to the ones [Deputy Mulder] requested, so long as it does not delay the test or 
tests requested by [Deputy Mulder]." Addendum B, f 10; Addendum C at 13. 
Officer Mulder further explained to Gonzales that his only chance to comply was 
by a blood draw. Addendum B, f 10. Gonzales responded, "I have already take one test, 
I'm not going to take another." Addendum B, f 10. Deputy Mulder then explained to 
Gonzales that the Intoxilyzer test result did not qualify because there was an insufficient 
sample, and Gonzales's failure to follow the instructions for blowing into the Intoxilyzer, 
was considered a refusal. Addendum C at 24-25. Deputy Mulder told Gonzales, that in 
case he had a lung problem or anything of that nature, Gonzales's only way around a 
revocation would be to take the blood test. Addendum C at 24. The Deputy asked 
Gonzales again. Petitioner just repeated himself. Addendum B, f 10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court did not err when it ruled that Deputy Mulder properly warned 
Gonzales of the consequences of refusing the requested blood test. Deputy Mulder's 
warning to Gonzales of the consequences of refusing the blood test were more than 
adequate under Utah law. Gonzales's arguments are without legal or factual basis. 
First, no evidence was presented by Gonzales that showed he was confused when 
Deputy Mulder showed him the Intoxilyzer print-out showing an "insufficient sample" and 
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a highest value obtained. Gonzales neither testified nor presented any evidence on his 
behalf. Second, whether or not Gonzales was confused does not have any affect on the 
adequacy of Deputy Mulder's warnings. In addition to reading the refusal admonition that 
warned Gonzales that his license could be revoked for refusing the blood test, Deputy 
Mulder also explained in lay terms that the breath test was an insufficient sample, which 
can count as a refusal, and that the only way Gonzales could avoid a refusal was to submit 
to a blood test. Last, Gonzales's argument that Deputy Mulder was required to read all of 
the chemical test admonitions off the DUI Report form verbatim, twice, is not based on 
any legal authority and should be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT RULED 
THAT GONZALES REFUSED THE REQUESTED 
CHEMICAL TESTS AFTER BEING ADEQUATELY 
INFORMED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING. 
Gonzales argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that Gonzales refused the 
requested chemical test and upheld the Division's eighteen month revocation of his driving 
privilege because Deputy Mulder allegedly did not give him a fair explanation of his rights 
and duties. Specifically, Gonzales argues that, when Deputy Mulder showed him the 
Intoxilyzer computer print-out which included a highest value obtained as .195, Gonzales 
was improperly lead to believe he had in fact provided a valid sample and that Deputy 
Mulder did not clarify that Gonzales must submit to multiple tests. Gonzales further 
argues that Deputy Mulder should have read Gonzales all of the chemical test admonitions 
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off of the DUI Report form verbatim, including the refusal admonition at the time of the 
Intoxilyzer test and at the time he requested Gonzales to take a blood test. Gonzales's 
arguments lacks foundation in authority, facts or logic. 
A* Deputy Mulder discharged his duty to warn Gonzales of the consequences 
of refusing the requested blood test by giving him a fair explanation of his rights and 
duties. 
First, no evidence was presented at trial which supports Gonzales's argument that 
he was confused when he was shown the Intoxilyzer print-out. The trial court specifically 
stated on the record that there was no evidence that could support a finding that Gonzales 
was confused. Addendum C at 30-31. Gonzales neither testified at trial nor presented any 
evidence on his behalf. Gonzales is asking this Court, as he did the trial court, to infer 
facts from the evidence presented at trial. The trial court specifically stated that, because 
Gonzales did not testify, it could not "discern what was in Mr. Gonzales' [sic] mind, 
whether he was confused or not." Addendum B at 31. 
Second, regardless of whether or not Gonzales was confused, Deputy Mulder's 
warnings to Gonzales were more than adequate under Utah law. Under Utah law an 
objective standard applies to determine the legal sufficiency of an officer's warnings. 
Beck v. Cox, 597 R2d 1335, 1339 (Utah 1979). What controls is what the officer says and 
what the arrested person says and does, not the arrested person's state of mind. 
Utah law requires that, "[i]f the person has been placed under arrest, has then been 
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests . . . , and 
refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the peace 
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officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in 
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.10(2) (West 2004). "'An officer properly discharges his duty if he gives an explanation 
that a person of reasonable intelligence, who is in command of his senses could 
understand;" Lee v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah l9$6)(quoting Muir v. Cox, 
611 P2d. 384, 386 (Utah 1980)). A driver must affirmatively agree to submit to a test 
immediately following a clear warning of the consequences of refusal, otherwise refusal is 
presumed. Lee, 722 P2d. at 738 (citing Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 
1984)). 
The Supreme Court, in Beck, held that an officer is not required to know the state 
of mind of the person arrested and determine whether such person understood he was 
refusing to submit to the test. Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d at 1339. The officer's judgment 
must be made under an objective standard. IcL "Obviously the arresting officer cannot 
know the subjective state of mind of the person arrested and whether he in fact intended 
his response to a request that would result in license revocation." Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 
1331, 1333 (Utah 1979). The behavior of the driver must clearly indicate, judged 
objectively, that the driver intended to refuse the test. Id. When a driver manifests to the 
officer that he does not understand his duty under the implied consent law the officer has a 
responsibility to clarify the driver's rights and responsibilities. See Id. at 1334. 
The evidence in this case shows that Deputy Mulder fully explained to Gonzales 
that the first test was invalid, that he was requesting Gonzales to take a blood test, and that 
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his license would be revoked for a period of eighteen months if he refused to take a blood 
test. Deputy Mulder was not required to know the state of mind of Gonzales. Deputy 
Mulder was required to give Gonzales a clear warning of the consequences of a refusal 
and to clarify any expressed misunderstandings of the implied consent law. Deputy 
Mulder did this. 
The bottom line is that Deputy Mulder was being kind when he gave Gonzales a 
second chance to comply with his request to take a chemical test. He could have treated 
Gonzales's failure to blow into the Intoxilyzer properly as a refusal, but he did not. See 
Beck. 597 P.2d at 1339 (the volitional failure by the person arrested to do what is 
necessary in order that the test can be performed is a refusal). Deputy Mulder called in a 
blood technician. Once the blood technician arrived, Deputy Mulder asked Gonzales to 
take a blood test, and Gonzales refused, stating, "I have already taken a test." Not only did 
Deputy Mulder read Gonzales the refusal admonition verbatim, but in response to 
Gonzales's statement that he already had taken the test, Deputy Mulder clarified to 
Gonzales that the first test was an insufficient sample and his only way to comply was to 
take the blood test. 
No evidence was presented at trial that Gonzales told Deputy Mulder that he 
thought he had complied because he thought the breath result was valid. Gonzales now 
asks this court (as he did the trial court) to determine his state of mind and infer that he 
was confused because he was shown the Intoxilyzer print-out which included a highest 
value obtained. However, Deputy Mulder did not have to subjectively know the state of 
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mind of Gonzales. Deputy Mulder warned Gonzales of the consequences of refusing the 
blood test, and he clarified any misunderstandings that Gonzales expressed. However, 
Gonzales refused the blood test, knowing that his license could be revoked. 
B, Gonzales's argument that Deputy Mulder was required to read ail of the 
chemical test admonitions verbatim off the DUI report form twice lacks any legal 
authority and should be rejected. 
Gonzales also argues that because Deputy Mulder failed to read all three chemical 
test admonitions off of the DUI Report form at the time Gonzales was asked to take the 
breath test and again one hour later, when he was asked to take a blood test, Deputy Mulder 
failed to properly advise Gonzales of the implied consent law. However, Gonzales does 
not provide any legal authority in support of this argument. Gonzales cites no statutes, 
administrative rules or case law that mandates a police officer read any of the admonitions 
on the DUI report form verbatim at all. Gonzales merely cites to Holman, where the 
Supreme Court stated that "[fjairness and due process require that a person threatened with 
the loss of his driver's license should be afforded an opportunity to make a choice based on 
a fair explanation of his rights and duties." Holman, 598 P.2d at 1334. The Supreme Court 
in Holman did not hold that an arresting officer must read all of the chemical test 
admonitions verbatim off of the DUI Report form each time a new chemical test is 
requested. 
There is no requirement that an arresting officer read any of the admonitions 
verbatim off the DUI Report form. The admonitions are mere guidelines. An arresting 
officer could warn a driver who refused a chemical tests of the consequences of the refusal 
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without ever looking at the DUI report form as long as the officer gives the person a "fair 
explanation of his rights and duties," Holman, 598 P.2d at 1334, clear warning of the 
consequences of refusal, and an explanation that a person of reasonable intelligence, who is 
in command of his senses, could understand, Lee, 722 P.2d at 767. Deputy Mulder did just 
that in the instant case. Deputy Mulder did everything he could to help Gonzales comply 
with the request to take the chemical tests. Gonzales refused. As such, the District Court's 
conclusion that Gonzales refused the blood test following a clear warning of the 
consequences of the refusal should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Division respectfully requests that this court 
uphold the lower court's decision that Gonzales refused the requested chemical tests 
knowing the consequences of the refusal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ . day of December, 2004. 
.REBECCA D. WALDRON 
'Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Driver License Division 
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hand delivered an original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
450 South State, Fifth floor, PO Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and two 
copies by First Class Mail to Jason Schatz, Schatz & Anderson, 356 E. 900 S., Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111. 
Rebecca D. Waldron 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview with a licensed 
mental health therapist: 
(i) used to determine if a person is in need of: 
(A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse 
program; 
(B) an educational series; or 
(C) a combination of Subsections (l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105. 
(b) (i) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(A) this section; 
(B) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless 
driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(C) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled 
substance that is taken illegally in the body; 
(D) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or 
a combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43; 
(E) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; 
(F) Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g); 
(G) a violation described in Subsections (1) (b)(i)(A) through (F), 
which judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(H) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States which 
would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state, 
including punishments administered(under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(ii) A plea of guilty or no contest to a violation described in 
Subsections (l)(b)(i)(A) through (H) which plea is held in abeyance under 
Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, 
even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in 
accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement, for purposes of: 
(A) enhancement of penalties under: 
(I) this Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While Intoxicated and 
Reckless Driving; and 
(II) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; and 
(B) expungement under Section 77-18-12. 
I 
(c) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a 
substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "screening" means a preliminary appraisal of a person: 
(i) used to determine if the person is in need of: 
(A) an assessment; or 
(B) an educational series; and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(e) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance 
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(g) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed 
substance abuse program; 
(h) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local 
ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-
43; and 
(i) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure 
to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent 
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control; 
(iv) (A) is 21 years of age or older; 
(B) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent 
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .05 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of operation or actual physical control; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction; 
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or 
(v) (A) is 21 years of age or older; 
(B) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or 
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of operation or actual physical control; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of 
Subsections (2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 
years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a 
third degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury 
upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a 
negligent manner. 
(c) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(iv) or (v) is 
guilty of: 
(i) a class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the person has also inflicted bodily 
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a 
negligent manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 
consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
48 hours; or 
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(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found 
appropriate by a screening under Subsection (4)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse 
treatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order 
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood 
alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person 
in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found 
appropriate by a screening under Subsection (5)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d); and 
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse 
treatment is appropriate. 
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(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony 
if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is 
committed after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after 
July 1,2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes 
of this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the 
execution of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the 
court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order 
requiring the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance 
abuse treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive 
care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through 
after treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the 
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which 
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a screening; 
an assessment, if appropriate; and an educational series; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, 
substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a 
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection 
(9). 
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(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening, 
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in 
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-
6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in 
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) (i) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person 
fails to: 
(A) complete all court ordered: 
(I) screening; 
(II) assessment; 
(III) educational series; 
(IV) substance abuse treatment; and 
(V) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(B) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and 
treatment costs. 
(ii) Upon receiving the notification described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), 
the division shall suspend the person's driving privilege in accordance with 
Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute 
for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not 
there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by 
the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether 
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the 
violation has occurred, although not in the peace officer's presence, and if 
the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was 
committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
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(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior 
conviction as defined under Subsection (I) if the violation is committed 
within a period often years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court 
under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension 
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
(12) (a) (i) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(ii) The additional suspension or revocation period provided in this 
Subsection (12) shall begin the date on which the individual would be 
eligible to reinstate the individual's driving privilege for a violation of 
Subsection (2). 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License 
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for a 
specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall 
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law 
enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of 
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be 
monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
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(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include 
a substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the 
time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to 
attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly 
between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement 
if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation 
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers 
by the court under Subsection (I3)(d)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor 
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, 
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and 
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that 
sentence or those conditions or orders. 
( d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with 
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall 
cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of. 16 or 
higher, the court shall order the following, or describe on record why the 
order or orders are not appropriate: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d); and 
(b) one or both of the following: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic 
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monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have 
given the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the personfs breath, 
blood, urine, or oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether the 
person was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite 
of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-
44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer 
having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, 
or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's 
body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered. 
(ii) If a peace officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person 
to take one or more requested tests, even though the person does submit to 
any other requested test or tests, is a refiisal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine, or oral fluids 
may not select the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any 
specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace 
officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative 
proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested test 
or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested 
by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under 
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the 
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a 
refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's 
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license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does 
not immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace 
officer be administered, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the Driver 
License Division and within 24 hours of the arrest, give notice of the Driver 
License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to 
operate a motor vehicle. When a peace officer gives the notice on behalf of 
the Driver License Division, the peace officer shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days 
from the date of arrest; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, in a manner specified by the Driver 
License Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing 
before the Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner 
specified by the Driver License Division, also serve as the temporary 
license certificate. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed 
report, within ten calendar days after the day on which notice is provided 
under Subsection (2)(b), that the peace officer had grounds to believe the 
arrested person had been operating or was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug 
under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to submit to 
a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's 
intention to revoke the person's license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten 
calendar days after the day on which notice is provided. 
(iii) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License 
Division, the Driver License Division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the 
Driver License Division under this Subsection (2)(e), the person's privilege 
to operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or 
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(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the 
previous ten years from the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-
44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-23 i, or 53-3-232; or 
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the 
previous ten years from the date of arrest under Section 41-6-44. 
(f) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(f)(h), if a hearing is 
requested by the person, the hearing shall be conducted by the Driver 
License Division in the county in which the offense occurred. 
(ii) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other 
county if the Driver License Division and the person both agree. 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a 
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 41-6-
44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test, 
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers, 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage 
from the Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in 
Section 78-46-28. 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the 
person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to 
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver 
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division shall 
revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah 
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the 
previous ten years from the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-
44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or 
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous 
ten years from the date of arrest under Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, 
in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under 
Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege 
is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
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(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed 
court decision following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) 
that the revocation was improper. 
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License 
Division under this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense occurred. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition 
rendering the person incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or 
tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in 
Subsection (I), and the test or tests may be administered whether the person 
has been arrested or not 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to the person. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person 
authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, 
may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This 
limitation does not apply to taking a urine, breath, or oral fluid specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person 
authorized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, 
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason 
to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal 
liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at the persons own expense, have a 
physician of the persons own choice administer a chemical test in addition 
to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible 
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in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to 
have been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's 
body. 
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ADDENDUM 
B 
REBECCA D. WALDRON (6148) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAUK.L. SHURTLEFF(4666) 
AUonicy General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
P.O.Box M0857 
160 Bast 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 030925487 AA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on February 25, 2004, the 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Court Judge presiding. Petitioner was ill and not present, 
but was represented by his counsel, Jason A Schatz. Respondent was represented by his counsel, 
Rebecca f). Waldrou, Assistant Attorney General. The Court, having heard the evidence 
presented by the parties, the arguments on their belialf, and being fully advised in the premises, 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
., APR 2 2 20M 
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 " ^ O^uty Clerk 
JOIINGONZALICS, 
Petitioner, 
v.s. 
G. BAR ION BLACIvSTOCK, 
Respondent. 
hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L On September 17, 2003 at approximately 12:27 a.m., Officer Mulder received a 
dispatch of a hit and run accident. A description of the vehicle was given. The vehicle had rear 
ended another vehicle, then left the scene. The vehicle was followed by witnesses to the 
accident, who had called 911 and repoited the vehicle's movements until Officer Mulder arrived. 
2. When Officer Mulder arrived at 4522 W. Penny Cir. the witnesses pointed out the 
vehicle to Officer Mulder. At this point in time Officer Mulder observed the driver, who had just 
pulled into his driveway and was struggling to get out of the vehicle with his keys. 
3. Upon making contact with Petitioner the driver of the vehicle, Officer Mulder smelled 
a very strong sickening odor of alcoholic beverage, He noticed that Petitioner's speech was 
slurred and his balance was poor. Petitioner complained to the officer that he had bad knees. 
4. Petiliouer failed to follow Officer Mulder's instructions during the Horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test. Petitioner was told to follow the officer's finger's with his eyes only. Petitioner 
failed to do so. 
5. No further field sobriety tests were given because of Petitioner's bad knees, 
6< Officer Mulder placed Petitioner under arrest for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44 based on the hit and run accident, the odor of alcohol, Petitioner's slurred speech and his poor 
balance. 
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7. Officer Mulder read Petitioner the required chemical test admonitions verbatim as 
ihey appear on the Dlii report form. He first asked Petitioner if he understood that he was 
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a 
controlled substance or metabolite in his body. Petitioner responded, " Okay.5' 
8. Officer Mulder requested that Petitioner take breath test. Petitioner was informed that 
a test result that indicates an unlawful amount of alcohol, drub, or controlled substance or its 
metabolite in bis breath in violation of Utah Law may result in denial suspension, revocation or 
disqualification of your driving privilege or refusal to issm you a license. In response to the 
request to take a breath test, Petitioner stated., 4Tll do that." 
9. Petitioner did not comply with Officer Mulder's instructions for the intoxilyzcr. He 
blew into the inloxilyzcr numerous times, but would not maintain the blow for the length of time 
required to obtain a valid test result. Officer Mulder told him numerous times that he had to 
blow longer, but he did not The intoxilyer reported an "insufficient Sample" with a highest 
value obtained. Since Officer Mulder was unable to get a valid breath test, he called for a blood 
drw technician. 
10. Once the blood technician arrived at 2:54 a.m., Officer Mulder explained to Petitioner 
that he had failed to follow the instructions for the inloxilyzcr, which is considered a refusal. 
Officer Mulder showed him the result card and read him the refusal admonition verbatim off of 
the DC J! Report Form. Officer Mulder infonned Petitioner that" if you refuse the tests or fail to 
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follow my instructions the tests will not be given. However, I must warn you that your driving 
privilege may be revoked for 18 months for a first refusal or 24 months for a subsequent refusal 
with no provision for limited driving, Afer you have take the tests, you will be permitted to have 
a physician of you own choice administer a test at you own expense, in addition to the ones I 
have requested, so long as it does not delay the test or tests requested by me. 1 will make the test 
results available to you , if you take the tests. " Officer Mulder further explained that his only 
chance to comply was by a blood draw, Petitioner responded, "I have already take one test, I'm 
not going to take another. The Officer asked him again. Petitioner just repeated himself 
11. Petitioner was personally served notice of the Driver License Division's intent to 
revoke his driving privileges. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
L Officer Mulder had probable cause to arrest Petitioner for violation of section 41-6-44 
based of the reports of Petitioner's vehicle being involved in a hit and run accident Petitioner 
struggling to remove himself from the vehicle with the keys in his hands, the strong and 
sickening odor of alcohol coming from Petitioner, his slurred speech and his poor balance. 
2, Petitioner knowing refused the requested chemical tests. No evidence was resented by 
Petitioner. The evidence presented shows that Officer Mulder read the admonitions as required 
by law. In addition he went the extra mile and allowed Petitioner one more opportunity to 
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comply, flc w<is given the opportunity to take a blood tests after Petitioner failed to give a valid 
breath sample. However, Petitioner refused, 
3. Petitioner was personally served with notice of the Driver License Intent to suspend 
or revoke his license, 
ORDER 
IT ISIIRRRDY ORDERED: 
1. The revocation of ihe Petitioner's driving privilege for a period of eighteen (18) 
months commencing October 17,2003, is affirmed. 
2. Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review is dismissed with prejudice. 
77 
DATED TIHS ^ ^ DAY OF , 2004. 
BY THE COIJ 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Second District Court Judge 
Approved p> lo form-/ 
/ / / 
Auo'mey lor Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ANT) ORDER, postage prcpuid, on this J day of April, 2004, to 
the following: 
Jason Scliaiz 
Attorney at Law 
356 V.. 000 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 841U 
- / 
/ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
JOHN GONZALES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Case No. 030925487 
TRIAL DE NOVO 
(Videotape Proceedings) G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, 
Bureau Chief Driver Control 
Bureau, Driver License 
Division, Department of 
Public Safety, State of 
Utah, 
Respondents. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 25th day of 
February, 2004, commencing at the hour of 1:46 p.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: JASON A. SCHATZ 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: —030925487. Appearances, please. 
MR. SCHATZ: Jason Schatz on behalf of the 
petitioner in this case, your Honor. He's not present today. 
I spoke with him this morning, he's been ill for several days 
and hasn't even been getting out of bed, so we're ready to 
proceed without him. 
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you, Mr. Schatz. 
And Rebecca Waldron on behalf of the respondent. 
MS. WALDRON: For the State, yeah. 
THE COURT: I've—I've received the bench brief on 
issue of refusal submitted by Mr. Schatz. I think I 
understand the issues involved here. If either side wants to 
make an opening, they may; if not, then Ms. Waldron, you can 
call your first witness. 
You want to make an opening? 
MR. SCHATZ: Not at this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. WALDRON: I'll waive, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Call your first witness. You'll 
have the burden of going forward, as always. 
MS. WALDRON: As always. 
The respondent calls Officer Mulder. 
THE COURT: Officer Mulder, come forward and receive 
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the oath, please. 
RODNEY MULDER, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State on this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
witness stand and was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WALDRON: 
Q Sir, please state your name and occupation for the 
record? 
A My name is Rodney Mulder, M-u~l-d-e-r. I'm a deputy 
sheriff in patrol for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. 
Q And how long have you been a—a deputy with the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff? 
A Approximately two-and-a-half years. 
Q Were you a peace officer with any other agency prior 
to that? 
A No. 
Q What training and experience do you have in the 
recognition and apprehension of alcohol impaired drivers? 
A I'm certified through the State of Utah a s — 
intoxilyzer certified and D.U.I* detection and as well as 
doing numerous cases since my employment. 
Q Approximately how many D.U.I, cases have you 
investigated? 
A I would say between 40 and 50. 
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Q Directing your attention to September 17th, 200 3, at 
approximately 12:27 in the morning, were you on duty? 
A What was that date you mentioned? 
Q September 17th-
A I was, 
Q And at that time, did you overhear something over 
the dispatch? 
A I did. 
Q And what was that? 
A Our dispatch was notifying us that there was an—had 
been an accident which occurred on Bangerter—on Bangerter 
Highway, and the witnesses—there were witnesses, they 
observed it and they were following the vehicle involved in 
the accident, which had left the scene* 
I was hustling to get to the scene—actually not to 
the scene, but to get to the witnesses. We had another deputy 
that was responding to the accident and I was making an 
attempt to catch the other vehicle. 
Q And were you overhearing conversations over the— 
over your radio? 
A I was. 
Q And did you go to the location where the witnesses 
said they had followed the individual? 
A I did. 
Q And once at that location,—strike that. 
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What was that location that you arrived at? 
A That was 4522 West Penny Circle. 
Q And what did you observe upon going to that 
location? 
A Well, this is in a neighborhood. As I arrived into 
the neighborhood, the—Mr. Gonzales' residence is in a cul-de-
sac. Just outside that residence was the—the vehicle where 
our witnesses were, Mr. Robert Thompson and Matt Thompson. 
That was the first thing I saw, I saw their vehicle, their 
light—you know, that time in the morning, it was parked right 
there. 
I talked to them, they pointed out the vehicle that 
had left the scene, they told me what had happened; so 
therefore, I approached that vehicle and made contact with Mr. 
Gonzales. 
Q So, they pointed out a vehicle that was involved in 
the previous hit and run? 
A Correct. 
Q And did you go up to that vehicle? 
A I did. 
Q Was there anyone still inside that vehicle? 
A Mr. Gonzales was just getting out at the time. 
MS. WALDRON: Your Honor, may the record reflect 
that the—or, Counsel, will you stipulate that it was Mr. 
Gonzales that was inside the vehicle (inaudible). 
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MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, actually, I think we can 
probably stipulate to certain things; we're not challenging 
reasonable suspicion to stop or probable cause to arrest, o r — 
THE COURT: Great, 
MR, SCHATZ: —identification. We're really here 
about the refusal issue. 
THE COURT: All right. I appreciate that, Mr. 
Schatz. 
Identity will not be an issue then. He is not here, 
he has chosen to absent himself, but under the circumstances, 
that's not an issue. 
If in fact the stipulation includes everything was 
copisetic up to the time of the request for the blood draw and 
if you'd stipulate to that—or the request for the chemical 
test and if you want to stipulate to that, then we can move 
on. 
Do you want Ms. Waldron even to talk about the—the 
H.G.N, and/or the portable test? 
MR. SCHATZ: If there is a portable test. That— 
that's one issue, just whether or not a portable test was 
actually done. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SCHATZ: And also, the—the time that he was 
actually placed under arrest and what was done at that point 
are really the only issues. 
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THE COURT: We can move forward from there. 
MR. SCHATZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: Appreciate that, Mr. Schatz. Thank you. 
Q (By Ms. Waldron) Sir, did you give the petitioner a 
portable breath test? 
A I did not. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By Ms. Waldron) Just—just briefly, what was the 
petitioner's physical demeanor when—prior to arrest? 
A He had a very strong and—and I noticed sickening 
odor of alcohol, it was—it was—was strong, but it—it was— 
it was a sight that kinda turned your stomach a little bit, it 
was really bad. 
Also, his speech was slurring. He appeared to have 
poor balance, and he—when I asked him about it, he did say he 
had bad knees. 
Q When you say poor balance, could you be a little 
more specific on that? 
A Well, I—I have to first stipulate that I don't know 
him from day to day recognition of him, so I can't de—you 
know, start from a—a base point. 
Q Okay. 
A But from what I determined, he wasn't—he swayed 
when he walked, he—he had some difficulty standing on his 
own. 
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Q Okay, So, after you arrested the petitioner, did 
you transport him somewhere? 
A I did- I transported him to our special operations 
office where an intoxilyzer is. 
Q And at that point in time, did you read him the 
chemical test admonitions off the D.U.I, report form? 
A I did. 
Q Did you read him the first admonition verbatim? 
A I did. 
Q So, did you ask Mr. Gonzales if he understood that 
he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of controlled 
substance or metabolite in his body? 
A I did. And he responded okay. 
Q After that, did you request that he take a chemical 
test? 
A I did. 
Q And what did you request that he take? 
A Intoxilyzer. 
Q After you requested the petitioner take the 
intoxilyzer test, did you then read him the second admonition 
that informs him of the consequences of a test result that 
indicates an unlawful amount of alcohol in his system? 
A I did. 
Q And did you read that one verbatim? 
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1 A I did-
2 J Q And what was his response to your request that he 
3 take a chemical test? 
4 1 A He said—initially, he said he'd do that, but 
5 1 (inaudible) he didn't coraply with the instructions to do so. 
6 1 Q We'll just go step by step. 
7 A Okay* 
8 1 Q So, initially, he agreed to take the breath test? 
9 A He did, 
10 Q Did you check the mouth pursuant to Baker? 
11 A I did, 
12 J Q And did you follow—and you are certified to operate 
13 the Intoxilyzer 5000? 
14 A I am. 
15 Q Did you operate that machine according to the 
16 I instructions on the operational checklist? 
17 A I did. 
18 J Q And did you check off all those instructions as you 
19 did it? 
20 A I did. 
21 Q Did—were you able to get a valid result off that 
22 J intoxilyzer? 
23 J A No. Not what I considered a valid result. 
24 J Q And why was that? 
25 A He didn't blow in it properly with enough pressure 
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for a consistent amount of time for it to obtain a—an 
appropriate result. 
Q Prior to having Mr. Gonzales blow into the machine, 
did you explain to Mr, Gonzales what you required him to do? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And as he was blowing into the machine, what 
happened? 
A He just would stop blowing or wouldn't blow hard 
enough is what was happening. 
Q And what did you tell him when he would not blow 
hard enough for you or quit blowing? 
A I would tell him, blow harder, blow steady, keep— 
there's a tone on a machine, a steady tone. I said, you need 
to make that tone—you need to hear that tone, and it—it's a 
cue that tells you when you're doing it right, when you're 
not, and I was coaching him along the way to do it. 
Q And did—did he ever blow into the machine according 
to your instructions? 
A No. 
Q And so the machine registered what? 
A The machine stated that it was an insufficient—the-
-the read-out on the screen said insufficient sample. And 
then it printed out the card saying that the highest result 
obtained was .195. 
Q What did you do after not being able to get a valid 
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test result? 
A What I did was, I went ahead and called for a blood-
-I—I did read the other admonitions at 2:54, stating that if-
-if he refuses, that— 
Q So, let's just make it clear. After he failed to 
follow your instructions on the intoxilyzer, then did you read 
him the refusal admonition? The last admonition? 
A Well, what I did is I called for a blood tech first. 
Q Okay. 
A I took him over to the jail because I didn't want to 
go through the time of—of messing around with the breath. If 
he indeed was serious about wanting to take a test, then I was 
going to give him the opportunity. I didn't want it to come 
back on me, you know, got lung problems, they smoked, this and 
that; and this was just a way of bypassing all their cheap 
excuses and that's to call for a blood tech. 
Q You called for a blood tech? 
A I did. 
Q And then what happened? 
A Okay. This was at the jail, while we were waiting, 
took him to the jail. When the blood tech arrived, I read him 
that last admonition, i t — 
Q When you say the last admonition— 
A I'm sorry. 
Q —are you talking about the one that says, if you 
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refuse a test or fail to follow my instruction, a test will 
not be given? 
A Yes. 
Q However, I must warn you that your driving privilege 
may be revoked for 18 months for a first refusal or 24 months 
for a subsequent refusal, with no provision for limited 
driving? 
A That's correct. 
Q And did you further read that admonition to him 
where it states that after you've taken the test, you'll be 
permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer 
the test at your own expense, in addition to the ones I've 
requested, so long as it does not delay the test or tests 
requested by me, and I will make the test results available to 
you if you take the test; is that— 
A All— 
Q —what you read to the petitioner? 
A Yes. All of that. 
Q And then what happened? 
A Well, he stated to me, I've already taken one test, 
I'm not going to take another. 
Q And did you explain anything further to the 
petitioner? 
A I—I just reminded him that it didn't qualify 
because it was an invalid sample and—and that's considered a 
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refusal, because he failed to follow the instructions. 
Q And he still would not take the blood test, even 
though you gave him an opportunity to take a test? 
A Correct. 
MS. WALDRON: Your Honor, I have a document that 
I've marked as Respondent's—or Defendant's Exhibit 1. It's a 
D.U.I, summons and citation, handing counsel a copy. 
May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Yes. You may. 
Q (By Ms. Waldron) Sir, I'm showing you what's been 
marked as Respondent's Exhibit 1 for identification; do you 
recognize this? 
A I do. 
Q And what is it? 
A This is the summons and citations, the first part— 
first part of the D.U.I, form that we fill out when doing a 
D.U.I. 
Q Directing your attention to the lower portion of the 
form, did you fill out this portion? 
A I did. 
Q And this is what gives the—an individual notice of 
the Driver's License Division intent to suspend or revoke his 
license; correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q And what did you do with the defendant's—strike 
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that—petitioner's copy of the D.U.I, summons and citation? 
A I served it to him at 2:57 in the morning, hand to 
hand. 
Q So, you served it on his person? 
A I did, at the jail. 
MS. WALDRON: One moment, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. SCHATZ: Again, your Honor, service is not an 
issue that we intend on raising either. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Schatz. 
Q (By Ms. Waldron) After you read him the refusal 
admonition, did you explain to him that taking the blood test 
was his only means to comply with the requirement? 
A I did. I—I usually, after reading it, I—I discuss 
it with them, are there any questions, layman's terms, is 
there something that you don't understand; and that's what I 
said, this is the last chance. 
Q Okay. And did he ever agree to do the blood draw? 
A No. That was his last—no. He said—according to 
him, he took it already and he complied is what he was saying. 
MS. WALDRON: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Schatz? 
15 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SCHATZ: 
Q Were you the only officer at the scene at his 
residence? 
A At—prior to taking him into custody, I was. 
Q Okay. And now when you say you took him into 
custody, exactly at what point was that? According to your 
report, you did attempt to perform the H.G.N, test? 
A That is correct. 
Q And then with regard to any other tests, they 
weren't conducted, according to your report, because he said 
he had bad knees, but that he was already in custody; had you 
placed him in handcuffs at that point? 
A I believe—I don't rec—I don't believe I placed him 
in custody until after he refused. 
Q Okay. 
A I—let me—I don't want to confuse that with the 
intoxilyzer. Until after he said that he had the bad knees 
and I knew I couldn't go on any further at that time. 
Q At that point, you made the decision that he was 
under arrest? 
A That's correct. 
Q And that's the point when you placed him in 
handcuffs? 
A Yes. 
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Q Okay. And when you placed him in handcuffs, did you 
read him his Miranda warning at that point? 
MS, WALDRON: Objection, irrelevant. 
THE COURT: What's the relevance? 
MR. SCHATZ: The relevance, your Honor, is if he 
read hira the Miranda warnings at that time and then later, he 
did not ever read him the—the admonition about his right to 
counsel and right to remain silent never applied for this 
purpose. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll—I'll—I'll allow it. 
THE WITNESS: I did not read hira Miranda. 
MR. SCHATZ: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Schatz) So, at that point, you said you 
placed hira under arrest, transported him to the Salt Lake 
County Special Ops; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And at that time, when you initially reguested that 
he submit to the chemical test, he agreed to do that and at 
that point, it was your impression that he was going to comply 
with the intoxilyzer? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. And you said that you observed Baker? 
A That's correct. 
Q And do you know exactly what time you observed 
Baker? 
17 
A 0027 hours in the morning. 
Q Okay. Did you do it again, later on? 
A No. 
Q Okay. Do you have a copy of the breath test print-
out there with you? 
A I do. 
Q Mind taking a look at that for me? 
Now, on your—is that your handwriting on there? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. Is there more than one time that you noted 
where you observed Baker? 
A Okay. You're right. I didn't see that. Based on 
this, based on what I wrote here— 
Q Uh huh. 
A Oh, I'd better re-state this. 
At 1:43 is when I took the Baker then. 
Q Okay. And at what time was this breath test 
attempted to be conducted? What's the time on the subject 
test? 
Same line where it reads .195. 
A 1:57. 
Q And doesn't the Baker test require that you wait at 
least 15 minutes after checking the mouth before you conduct 
the test? 
A It does. 
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Q And how long did you wait? 
Isn't it true you only waited 14 minutes? 
A That's what—that's what it looks like. 
Q So, you didn't properly observe Baker prior to doing 
the breath test, did you? 
MS. WALDRON: Objection. Irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Argumentative to that extent. 
Go on. 
Q (By Mr. Schatz) Now, initially, when you went 
through the warnings with him, you initially advised him at 
approximately 1:50 a.m. that he was under arrest for D.U.I. 
He agreed to submit to the chemical test. 
Can you tell me—I mean, because he's not here, how 
would you describe Mr. Gonzales? Is he a big man? 
A No. Not particularly. 
Q Sort of—bigger than I am? Smaller than I am? 
A I'd say—I'd say he's probably—I think—I'm 
thinking about 5'6", maybe a little bit, around that area. 
Q And as far as his age, I mean, is he an older 
gentleman? 
A Yes. 
Q In his 60's? 
A I was thinking around 50's. 
Q Okay. Do you ever have any—ever have a situation 
arise where you have someone who is older, who has difficulty 
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providing a sufficient sample for the breath test, because of 
age or, like you mentioned before, smoking or—or some other 
thing that they may have some diminished lung capacity? 
A It—it's hard—that—that—what I have seen has 
generally been (inaudible), I can't say that I've actually 
seen anybody just out of pure age, no. 
Q I mean, in this particular situation, did he just 
ever flat out refuse to blow? 
A No. 
Q He was trying? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. And after several tries, you—did you just, 
you know, tell him, we're done, or what happened at that 
point? 
A Well, the intoxilyzer shuts it down after a little 
bit of trying, after a little while. 
Q When it did that, did you make a second attempt, to 
try to do another intoxilyzer? 
A No. Actually, I did not. 
Q All right. And at that time, you then just decided, 
this guy isn't going to do the breath test, so that's when you 
called for the blood technician? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. And at any time prior to calling for the 
blood technician, did you ever read him the admonition that 
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his refusal could result in a suspension of his license? 
A I—I can't say for sure whether or not I read it 
previously to the time I noted doing it, but— 
Q You noted on your report that that wasn't done until 
2:54, approximately an hour later? 
A I in—I do speak—I do talk to them about asking 
them if there's any questions, I mean, as far as read any 
formal statement— 
Q I just—maybe let me rephrase that. Did you—you 
know, according to your report, you did not read that 
admonition until—to him until approximately 2:54 a.m., 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, there was a reading given on the—the breath 
test; correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And it was a .195? 
A Correct. 
Q And did you show that to Mr. Gonzales? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And did you show them the card that specifically 
said that there was a reading of .195? 
A I showed him as insufficient sample, I don't know 
that I pointed out the .195. 
Q Okay. I mean, did you specifically tell him that a 
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•195, even though it's an insufficient sample, would not be 
admissible in court against him? 
A I don't know that I mentioned that. 
Q Okay. So, it's possible that—that he could have 
looked at that, observed that it did give a reading of .195? 
MS. WALDRON: Objection. Calls for speculation. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Schatz) It's listed right there on the card 
that you showed him, isn't it? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. And later on, when you asked him to take the 
blood draw, his response to you was, I've already taken one 
test, I'm not going to take another; correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. What—what exactly went on during the 
approximately one hour between the time of the initial 
attempts and the time that the blood tech arrived? 
A He was sitting in the jail cell at the time. 
Q Was there any conversation between the two of you? 
A I—you know, I did explain to him, I—I always, just 
in layman's terms, other than reading that, Is there any 
questions about this, what don't you understand? And as clear 
as day, the man speaks English. 
Q Uh huh. Do you ever specifically tell him that when 
someone's placed under arrest for a D.U.I, that they're 
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required to submit to multiple tests, if they're requested? 
A I don't know that I particularly mentioned that. 
Q Okay- And that's not included in any of the 
admonitions there, is it, that you read? 
A It doesn't state that he has to take multiple tests, 
no. 
Q All right. Now, had—let me ask you this, had he 
done the blood draw, would you have marked him as a refusal? 
A No. 
MR. SCHATZ: Can I have just a minute, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
Q (By Mr. Schatz) When the blood technician arrived 
approximately 2:54 a.m., approximately an hour had gone by 
during that period, did you go back and again go through the 
admonitions that you had read to him an hour previously? 
A I don't believe I re-read them, no. 
Q Okay. The only one that is given at the time the 
blood tech arrived was the refusal admonition, the one saying 
if he refused the test he'd lose his license for 18 to 24 
months? 
A That's correct. 
Q Based on his statements, when you—when the blood 
tech arrived and you again asked him to take the test, his 
response again was, I've already taken one test, I'm not going 
to take another; is that correct? 
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A That's correct. 
Q And at that point, did you take any steps to clear 
up his misunderstanding about the fact that he hadn't actually 
completed the full test? 
A Yes, sir- I did. 
Q All right. And what specifically did you tell him? 
A I told him that he was failing to follow 
instructions because of the invalid sample, and that this was 
his option. In case there is a lung problem or anything of 
that nature, this is his option, it's his way out, basically, 
to avoid that revocation. 
Q Did you ever specifically tell him that an 
intoxilyzer insufficient reading was inadmissible? 
A I don't think I told him that. You're referring to 
the .195? 
Q Right. 
A I don't think I mentioned that. 
MR. SCHATZ: I have nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Schatz? 
Ms. Waldron, do you have anything more of Deputy 
Mulder? 
MS. WALDRON: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Deputy Mulder, you may stand 
down. Thank you very much. 
Any other witnesses, Ms. Waldron? 
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MS. WALDRON: No further witnesses, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Schatz? 
MR. SCHATZ: No witnesses, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. Brief argument? 
MS. WALDRON: Yes. Your Honor, the—the only issue 
here today is whether or not the—the petitioner—or strike 
that—the respondent can show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that there was a knowing refusal to take the 
requested chemical test. 
I think the evidence submitted here today is more 
than sufficient. You have the officer's testimony that he 
read him the admonitions, he gave—initially asked the 
petitioner to take a breath test. He explained to the 
petitioner exactly how he wanted him to blow into the machine, 
what was required during the test when it appeared that the 
petitioner was not blowing hard enough or long enough. 
The officer testified that he encouraged him, 
saying, no, you need to blow longer. . The—the results of the 
breath test was he failed to follow the instruction, there was 
not a valid result. 
At that point in time, the officer could have read 
him the refusal admonition and informed him of the 
consequences of a refusal; but in this case, the officer 
decided to give the petitioner the benefit of the doubt, let 
him take a blood test. He explained to the petitioner in 
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layman's terras the requirement of, I'm going to let you take a 
blood test because the breath test wasn't successful, at which 
time the petitioner stated, I've already taken a test, I'm not 
going to take any more. 
The officer still allowed the petitioner to wait for 
the blood tech to arrive to see if he would take the test at 
that point in time. The petitioner still wouldn't take the— 
do the blood draw, at which time, the officer testified that 
he read him the—the refusal admonition verbatim, told him the 
consequences of what's going to happen. 
The case law—the case law is pretty clear. In 
Cowan vs. Schwendiman, I have a copy of it for the Court, if 
you'd like. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. WALDRON: It's very clear what the officer's 
burden is. It says, An officer properly discharges his duty 
if he gives an explanation that a person of reasonable 
intelligence, who is in command of his senses, would 
understand. Well, that's Lee vs. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766. 
And the court stated in that case, that, We have held that a 
driver must affirmatively agree to submit to a test 
immediately following clear warnings of the consequences of a 
refusal. 
I don't think the officer here could have been any 
more clear to the petitioner of what his choices were. The 
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officer went an extra length to get a—a chemical test so the 
individual would not have a refusal and he just wouldn't go 
for it. 
And I'll submit it 
THE COURT: Okay, Thank you, Ms, Waldron. 
Mr. Schatz? 
MR- SCHATZ: Your Honor, the legal basis of what 
we're arguing here is—is what's been set forth in the case of 
Holman vs. Coxf which was outlined in the brief that I've 
submitted, so I'm just going to keep this real quick. 
What's important here is that we're dealing with 
individuals who do not do this on a daily basis. These are 
your average people, walking down the street. They're not 
police officers, they're not attorneys, they're not judges; 
they are unfamiliar with this process and there's a very 
particular process, by the way, in which an officer is 
authorized to request a chemical test. 
Anyone who's ever seen a four-page D.U.I, report 
form knows that these things are in there for a reason and 
there's in there in a particular order, for the assurances of 
making sure that that driver in that situation is aware of 
what his rights are and has a clear understanding of those 
things. 
And I think that the court summed it up very well 
when they said fairness and due process require that a person 
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1 threatened with the loss of his driver's license should be 
2 J afforded an opportunity to make a choice based on a fair 
3 explanation of his rights and duties. And I don't think that 
4 I Mr. Gonzales got that in this case. 
5 I don't know necessarily that it was the officer's 
6 intention to confuse him, but in the manner in which this 
7 J case—this is not a normal D.U.I, arrest from what we normally 
8 I would see. There's—we've got a situation where he initially 
9 I requested one test. At that time, he read him two 
10 admonitions, he read him the initial admonition—well, he said 
11 he was placing him under arrest, requested the test, and then 
12 I read the unlawful amount admonition. 
13 I In this situation, Mr. Gonzales is 63 years old, 
14 he's a very small man— 
15 THE COURT: We don't know that, do we? 
16 MR. SCHATZ: Well, based on the officer's testimony, 
17 he's an older gentleman who's smaller in stature than I am. 
18 THE COURT: Excuse me. Fifty-ish. I'm fifty-ish. 
19 I'm not an older gentleman. 
20 MR. SCHATZ: That's what I (inaudible) 
21 THE COURT: But, no. I understand, Mr. Schatz; but-
22 -but I'm emphasizing a point and the point is, you're trying 
23 this case with one hand tied behind your back. 
24 MR. SCHATZ: I understand, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: And that's why I'm—I'm—I'm giving you 
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some difficulty about what's on the record. 
MR, SCHATZ: Okay. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, according to the officer's 
testimony, he was in his 50's and smaller in stature than I 
am. And even the officer basically said, he was trying to 
blow into the machine, he simply didn't blow long and hard 
enough; but the officer, at that point, wasn't going to mark 
him as a refusal. He said that he was going to give him an 
opportunity to do the blood test. 
So, I think these need to be treated as two separate 
incidences, because we've got an hour's worth of time 
separating these two things. I think that the admonition 
should have been given completely during the initial 
breathalyzer, which it was not given, and there was no refusal 
admonition given at that point. 
He waits approximately an hour later and during that 
time period, he shows him the breath test card that shows that 
there is a numeric reading and I think based on what Mr. 
Gonzales told the officer, it was his understanding that a 
reading was given, that he had already taken one test he 
didn't have to take another. 
And I don't think that the officer made it clear to 
him at that point that he was required to take multiple tests, 
if that's what the officer requests, and that's not included 
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anywhere in the admonitions. 
And because of the time frame, I think what should 
have happened is when he went back and requested the blood 
test an hour later, he should have started from the beginning 
and went through the admonitions to make sure that it was 
clear in Mr. Gonzales' mind what his rights and duties were in 
this situation. 
And I think, based on the totality of what occurred 
here, again, it's not the normal procedure that we see in a 
D.U.I, case. There was definitely some variances. I think 
Mr. Gonzales' responses to the officer's request demonstrate 
his confusion and based on Holman vs. Cox, he didn't get that, 
that fairness and due process, fair explanation of his rights 
and duties. And therefore, it was an unknowing refusal in 
that situation. And even the officer said he wouldn't have 
counted the breathalyzer refusal, and with regard to the blood 
test, that wasn't a knowing refusal. And therefore, it 
shouldn't be—result in suspending his license. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Let me make an observation. Number one, I commend 
Mr. Schatz for his presentation and his argument in this 
matter. 
Number two, he is asked to try this case with one 
hand tied behind his back. The issue is what Mr. Gonzales' 
state of mind is—was, at the time of the arrest, at the time 
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of the admonitions, at the time of the testing, at the time of 
the refusal, if any there be. 
That is fact sensitive, as Mr- Schatz has indicated 
in his memo to the Court. Unfortunately, we don't have that 
side of the story, so I cannot discern what was in Mr. 
Gonzales' mind, whether he was confused or not. 
The arguments are well taken, however, they lack any 
substantive basis for it. Just as an example, Mr. Schatz 
indicates this is an unusual D.U.I. Well, unusual for whom? 
I don't know if Mr. Gonzales had gone through four or five 
D.U.I.s and is saying, hey, this isn't the way it was on ray 
other four or five D.U.I.s. If this is his first D.U.I., then 
it's not unusual to him at all, he has no basis to understand 
and to compare as to differences or anything else. 
The long and short of it is, I believe that Deputy 
Mulder not only read the admonitions as indicated on a 
verbatim basis, but did go the extra mile. Under the adage of 
no good deed goes unpunished, he attempted to allow Mr. 
Gonzales one more opportunity, after the initial insufficient 
sample and after he could have said a refusal at that time, 
but he allowed him one more opportunity and explained to him 
regarding the refusal. 
As I indicated, what was in Mr. Gonzales' mind is 
absent from the record. The Court can only go on the evidence 
here and—and accordingly, the petition is denied and the 
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relief requested is denied. 
But 
MR. 
THE 
good job. 
SCHATZ: 
COURT: 
Thank you. 
MR. 
MS. 
THE 
We'] 
SCHATZ: 
WALDRON 
COURT: 
Thank you, your 
Mr.—Ms. Waldron, 
Anything more? 
Nothing further, 
: No. That's it, 
Very well. 
re in recess. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was 
* * * 
Honor. 
please be so kind. 
your 
your 
Honor. 
Honor. 
concluded.) 
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